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This paper explores how the idea of resilience has made its way into the external 
action of the European Union (EU) and selected member states (Germany, France and 
Italy) as a means to address areas of limited statehood and contested orders. It 
examines the debates informing the development of the EU’s external action and 
current concerns in economic, political, and migration instruments. The main 
findings are that the EU’s economic and political instruments have become gradually 
dominated by resilience framings, with an emphasis on multilateralism, adaptation, 
and long-term and bottom-up responses. Resilience also increasingly drives the 
humanitarian assistance and development cooperation policies in Germany and to a 
lesser extent France, which have gradually moved away from top-down 
administrative and centralized models of governance. The EU and member states like 
Italy, however, have been more reluctant to foster resilience to address migration 
issues. Instead, they have prevented flows of irregular migrants into Europe by 
means of containment strategies such as improving border management, policing, 
and surveillance and combating smuggling networks. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores how the idea of resilience has made its way into the external 
action of the EU and selected member states (Germany, France, and Italy), as a means 
to address areas of limited statehood (ALS) and contested orders (CO). ALS are seen as 
spaces – from states and countries to cities and rural areas – in which authorities and 
institutions are too weak to govern and enforce rules and often lack control of the 
monopoly of force (Risse and Stollenwerk 2018). CO are seen as state and non-state 
actors that challenge the generalized EU norms and principles according to which 
societies and political systems are ruled and should be organized (Börzel and Risse 
2018a; on contestation of norms, see also Deitelhoff and Zimmermann [2013]; Wolff 
and Zimmermann [2016]). The assumption is that both areas of limited statehood and 
contested orders represent risks and potential threats that challenge the external 
action of the EU and its member states. As Börzel and Risse (2018a: 2) state: “Only if 
and when areas of limited statehood and contested orders deteriorate into 
governance breakdowns and violent conflict do the risks turn into threats to the 
security and stability of the EU, its member states, and citizens”. Thus ALS/CO cannot 
be ignored: they will remain, and more will appear in the future. 
To understand how the idea of resilience permeates different policies and 
instruments to address ALS/CO, the paper examines the debates informing the 
development of EU external action and current concerns in the foreign policy of 
Germany, France, and Italy. Whereas others in the EU-LISTCO project are exploring 
how ALS/CO come about or how they tip over into governance breakdowns or 
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conflict, here the focus is on the external action instruments of the EU and member 
states. It is a comprehensive review of the existing literature, aiming to inform 
future research on the capacities of the EU and member states to foster resilience in 
ALS/CO. In this paper, the instruments are divided into three policy fields: 
(a) economic, which enables the EU and member states to enter into agreements and 
provide aid to third countries;  
(b) political, which allows the EU to exert influence in peace and crisis management 
related tasks, and;  
(c) mobility, which refers to the instruments involved in dealing with challenges 
connected to migration, such as countering migrant smuggling and containing 
trafficking.  
The third policy field, mobility, has often been neglected in various categorizations 
of the instruments of EU’s external action (see, e.g., Smith 2014: 44–65), but it is added 
here to include increasingly important debates around migration that affect the EU 
and its member countries. 
In the last decade, these three policy areas have gained attention after the provisions 
of the Lisbon Treaty in the field of external action and the implementation and 
follow-up of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS 2016). The EUGS has received generalized 
interest among scholars, and it is often seen as a modest and pragmatic approach to 
conducting external action that enables the EU to respond to the challenges of a 
contested, connected, and complex world (EEAS 2015; see also Juncos 2017; Tocci 2016; 
Wagner and Anholt 2016). The idea of resilience, which features prominently in the 
EUGS and tinges the current foreign policy instruments of both the EU and, 
gradually, those of the member states, represents a gradual shift in the manner of 
addressing external action concerns. (For seminal works on resilience in 
International Relations (IR), see Chandler [2014]; Joseph [2018]). But, obviously, the 
trajectory of the EU’s external action precedes the recent conceptualizations of 
resilience. Thus, it is important for this paper to map the debates in historical 
perspective and assess how the EU and member states’ capacities and instruments 
have evolved into current proposals and policy priorities. 
The body of the paper is divided into three sections. The next section summarizes the 
main institutional debates about the development of the EU’s external action, which 
are important in framing the debate on the nature of the EU and its role in IR. The 
third section reviews what has been said about the instruments and policies that the 
EU wields to enhance resilience in ALS/CO. These will be divided into economic, 
political, and mobility instruments. Finally, the paper addresses the debates on how 
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Germany, France, and Italy, as particularly relevant member states, are contributing 
to the same policy fields and increasingly adopting resilience frameworks, drawing 
some parallels between member states’ foreign policy and the EU’s external action. 
2. DEBATES INFORMING THE DEVELOPMENT OF EU EXTERNAL 
ACTION 
The establishment of the EU as an international actor with a common foreign and 
security policy can at least be traced back to the development of the European 
Political Cooperation in 1970. Two decades later, international events such as the fall 
of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the Gulf War, or the conflict in Yugoslavia 
influenced the adoption of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the 
Maastricht Treaty (1993) as a key development of European integration (Krotz and 
Maher 2011; Nuttall 2000; Smith 2014). The 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam further 
enhanced the role of the European Council to decide on the common positions and 
strategies of the CFSP, although the modifications to cohere the field of foreign 
policy were seen as too modest (Dehousse 1998). After Amsterdam, member states 
began to work on a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, renamed Common 
Security and Defence Policy, or CSDP, after the Lisbon Treaty) to run civilian and 
military missions abroad. 
In order to enhance the global influence of the EU, the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon created 
the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the leadership of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the Vice-
President of the European Commission (HR/VP). Rather than a supranational 
institution like the European Commission or the European Parliament or an 
essentially intergovernmental one like the Council of the European Union, the EEAS 
both deals with the methods of member states’ cooperation and decision-making in 
foreign policy and maintains complex relations with the Commission in external 
relations (Helwig et al. 2013: 6). Since external action is split between multiple actors 
and policies, and a precise account of this complex institutional structure falls 
beyond the scope of the paper, the preference here will be to refer to the EU’s 
‘external action’ as the sum of the EU's foreign policy, where member states remain 
the most important actors (as in the CFSP and CSDP), and its external relations, 
where the Commission enjoys longstanding prerogatives (Morillas 2019a). 
Drawing on interviews with officials from EU institutions and member states, 
Morillas (2019b) argues that the HR/VP and the EEAS have substantially increased 
their autonomy in the traditionally intergovernmental EU foreign and security 
policies. Relatedly, the term “Brusselization” has also been used to understand both 
the influence that Brussels-based institutions exert on member states and the 
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transformation of their policies as a consequence of EU membership (Koops 2011: 
212). Over the years, the tendency towards more integration has generated a plural 
debate on the accountability of EU institutions and the degree to which people’s 
demands are represented in the EU’s political decision-making processes (for 
example, see Bang et al. [2015]; Bellamy [2010]; Murdoch et al. [2018]). 
However, other authors have observed that, even if the EU has generally advanced 
towards supranationalism, the foreign security policy remains a bastion of state 
sovereignty and intergovernmentalism, where member states have always had the 
upper hand vis-à-vis EU institutions (Fabbrini and Puetter 2016). These authors do 
not deny the lack of cooperation or the possibility of taking common decisions, but 
understand that sovereignty drives the decision to (not) cooperate and that 
intergovernmental forums are key to EU policy initiation and decision-making, to 
the detriment of the European Commission (Bickerton et al. 2014). Despite member 
states increasing integration and coordination within EU bodies, these authors imply 
that “integration take[s] place in the absence of supranationalism, with new 
institutions created that have concentrated the powers and activities of national 
governments and national representatives” (Bickerton et al. 2014: 717). 
Others prefer to take a middle ground position between supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism to qualify the degree of EU integration in foreign policy. 
Seminal here is Smith’s (2004) institutional analysis. He suggests that increasing 
participation by member states in EU institutions and processes erodes initial 
intergovernmental predispositions as institutions become involved in multiple 
networks and develop (positively or negatively) in new and unexpected ways (Smith 
2004). Hill also finds a balance between the two positions. He examined EU foreign 
security policy activities and argued that in some cases, like the Afghanistan and Iraq 
wars or the Israel-Palestine conflict, the preferences of European states diverged 
substantially and undermined the autonomy of the CFSP. Yet he discerns that, on 
some other occasions, like the responses to September 11 or anti-terrorist measures, 
member states have shown solidarity and a commitment to Europeanizing their 
foreign policy (Hill 2004). 
The institutional debates assessing the degree of EU integration provide the context 
against which to assess the nature of EU’s external action – a dominant assumption 
being that, without integration, the EU lacks ‘actorness’ and is thus incapable of 
performing a prominent role abroad (for an overview of the debate on actorness, see 
Drieskens 2017). If the questions during the Cold War were predominantly about 
whether the EU had a foreign policy at all (Bull 1982), during the 1990s they were 
more about what international role the EU could play. By noticing that the EU was 
not only expanding its trading capabilities but also committing to development aid, 
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democracy promotion, and humanitarian assistance, many scholars defined the 
specificity of the EU in the international system against Duchêne’s notion of a 
‘civilian power’ (Duchêne 1973), which emphasizes the use of civilian rather than 
military instruments in international relations (Aggestam 2008; Risse-Kappen 1996; 
Smith 2005; Stavridis 2001; Whitman 1998). 
Influentially, Manners (2002) argued that, rather the EU being defined as either a 
civilian or a military power, it should be understood as an entity capable of shaping 
conceptions of what can be considered ‘normal’ and setting standards in 
international politics, coining the term ‘normative power’ (see also Manners 2008). 
In tune with broader debates in IR, Manners and others shifted the focus to ideas and 
norms as key elements to understand the logic of the EU’s external action (Lucarelli 
and Manners 2006; see also Diez 2014). Throughout the 2000s in particular, different 
terminologies were used to capture the specificity of the Union, including ‘ethical’, 
‘responsible’, ‘gentle’, ‘pragmatic’ or ‘global’ power, and empirical research was done 
to conceptualize the nature of the external action of the EU (see also Sjursen 2006), 
while critics exposed the inconsistencies and limits of considering the EU a 
normative or civilizing power (Hyde-Price 2006; Whitman 2013). 
The self-image of the EU as a value-promoter is reflected in its strategic documents, 
which act as “autobiographical narratives” and are useful in tracing the evolution of 
its external action from the European Security Strategy in 2003 to the Global 
Strategy in 2016 (Mälksoo 2016: 376). Whereas, at the beginning of the 2000s, the EU 
sought to transform the world according to its image and likeness, today these 
external ambitions have decreased due to the urgency of resolving multiple internal 
crises and of facing a more troubling neighbourhood (Bendiek 2017; Morillas 2018). 
The EU’s shift – from being a willing and confident value-promoter to being a more 
defensive and pragmatic actor – can be seen in debates assessing the EU promotion 
of human rights, democracy, and multilateralism, which are considered key 
principles informing the EU’s external action. For example, while the European 
Union Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders sets out practical suggestions to 
protect and support organizations and civil society actors defending human rights in 
third country missions, the member states’ commitments to implement the 
guidelines in practice are “patchy and inconsistent” (Bennett 2015: 908). Furthermore, 
when examining EU activities in the East, some authors have observed that the EU 
has sacrificed norms to interests when cooperating with authoritarian regimes that 
have repeatedly violated human rights (Crawford 2008; Sharshenova and Crawford 
2017; Sicurelli 2017). 
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Like the promotion of human rights, democracy has been conceived as an 
opportunity to export European values and facilitate peace, stability, and economic 
prosperity abroad. The EU sought to endorse democracy through integrative 
relationships, partnerships, and socialization mechanisms, which helped countries 
stabilize in ways that went beyond institutional fixes (Freyburg et al. 2009; Keohane 
2002). Some authors have noted that the EU’s preference for enhancing democratic 
institutions that are inclusive of diverse civil society actors and are adapted to the 
historic-political context of each society have made the EU’s democracy promotion 
different in substance to those of the United States and the UN, which have 
traditionally focused on regime change and institution building ‘from above’ 
(Bargués-Pedreny 2016; Bridoux and Kurki 2015; Del Biondo 2015; Magen et al. 2009; 
Schmidt 2015). 
Yet the export of democracy does not mean, as Del Sarto (2015) argues, that the EU is 
not acting as an “empire”; indeed, looking at the EU responses to the Arab uprisings, 
she suggests that it is acting as a “normative empire”, reconciling interests and 
identities at the same time (see also Zielonka 2013). Other authors have also been 
critical of the EU’s efforts at democracy promotion, highlighting, among other 
pitfalls (for an overview, see Peters [2012]), the problems of implementing one-size-
fits-all programmes (Haukenes and Freyberg-Inan 2013), or the over-reliance on 
technocratic mechanisms (Kurki 2011). The tendency is to notice that the EU has 
altered the framing of democracy promotion, prioritizing security and stability 
concerns and pragmatic arrangements over institutional and regime change (Börzel, 
Dandashly and Risse 2015; Dandashly 2018). 
Also, an ‘effective multilateral’ agenda has been considered key for the EU in order to 
emphasize alliances and institutional and legal reforms in global affairs, relying on 
the export of the EU’s own recipe for success (Ujvari et al. 2016). Multilateralism is 
seen as a constructive strategy of engaging in global affairs in comparison to the 
more ‘assertive multilateralism’ proposed by the US (Cronberg 2017). The aims of 
multilateralism notwithstanding, often the priority of the EU has been to use 
bilateralism (via strategic partnerships) at the global level (Renard 2016; Song and 
Hall 2018). Critics have suggested that multilateralism requires long-term 
commitment and political and economic stability that are difficult to achieve in 
current international relations, which are dominated by uncertainty and shifting 
balances of power (Barbé et al. 2016; Peterson 2010). 
This shift towards a more pragmatic external action is, in part, influenced by the fact 
that, in the past decade, questions about European integration have become 
gradually politicized and contested among the public (De Wilder and Zürn 2012; 
Statham and Trenz 2013). Debates on how or what issues should be delegated to the 
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supranational level are becoming salient not only in the parliamentary settings of 
member states, but also in intermediary arenas like interest groups and the media, 
and even among the broader citizenry (Hurrelmann et al. 2013). Sometimes this 
politicization has been beneficial to open democratic and deliberative spaces that are 
seen to strengthen the union and its shared norms (Beck and Grande 2007; Deitelhoff 
and Zimmermann 2013). On other occasions, however, researchers have noted that 
politicization becomes problematic for the progress of European supranational 
policies. Influentially, Hooghe and Marks (2009) argued that politicization is a 
constraining force that hampers European integration, as the debate is framed by 
opponents of European integration and conducted in terms of nationalist identities. 
Rather than assuming that the politicization of the EU’s integration is inherently 
beneficial or problematic for its becoming a coherent actor that can shape 
international affairs, the tendency is to analyse such politicization in relation to the 
different contexts (countries or arenas) in which it takes place (Hurrelmann et al. 
2013: 44; Schimmelfennig 2017). For example, Börzel and Risse (2018b) have observed 
that, during the euro crisis, state governments transferred substantial fiscal 
competences to the EU level, countering the forces of politicization and euro-
scepticism that attempted otherwise (see also Dehousse 2016). By contrast, during the 
Schengen crisis, right-wing euro-sceptic parties successfully mobilized national 
identities and the need for exclusionary policies of border control, frustrating efforts 
at enhancing the role of supranational institutions (Börzel and Risse 2018b: 93–98). 
Barbé and Morillas (2019) contend that more politicization can lead to more 
integrationist practices in security and defence. 
Furthermore, the EU has toned down the transformative ambition of its external 
action due to internal tensions like the departure of the United Kingdom and a 
hostile international environment – from the growing contestation of liberalism and 
democracy to economic uncertainties, international crises like Syria or Libya, or 
complex and diffuse security threats. It is in this context that the paradigm of 
resilience is gradually permeating all foreign policy debates and instruments of the 
EU (Chandler 2014; Joseph 2018). As stated by the EUGS (2016: 23): 
It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to 
the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa. Fragility 
beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests. By contrast, resilience – the 
ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from 
internal and external crises – benefits us and countries in our surrounding regions, 
sowing the seeds for sustainable growth and vibrant societies. 
Resilience approaches are understood as means to overcome some of the limitations 
of liberal forms of intervention. Rather than exporting European norms and 
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institutions abroad, assuming that top-down models of governance could guarantee 
international peace and security, a focus on resilience seeks to improve modes of 
governance indirectly and through partnerships, embracing non-linear processes, 
context sensitivity, and bottom-up initiatives (Bourbeau 2015; de Weijer 2013; Dunn 
Cavelty et al. 2015). The next section explores the debates about the external action 
instruments of the EU and suggests that those instruments are increasingly tinged 
by the idea of resilience as a means to deal with ALS and CO. 
3. RESILIENCE IN THE EU’S EXTERNAL ACTION INSTRUMENTS 
This section looks at the debates regarding the external action instruments the EU 
wields to enhance resilience and prevent the risks of ALS and CO from tipping into 
governance breakdown and violent conflict. What matters is not so much why 
certain policy instruments have been used over others (as in public policy 
instrumentation approaches – for an overview, see Menon and Sedelmeier [2010]) 
but the debates that ensue when the instruments are implemented. 
We have categorized these instruments into three distinct policy areas: economic, 
which enable the EU to enter into agreements and provide aid to third countries; 
political, which relate to the influence of the EU in peace and crisis management 
related tasks; and those related to mobility and which seek to address the recent 
challenges connected to migration. This categorization may obscure the cross-
sectional dimension of most policies and the tensions from diverging and difficult to 
reconcile interests across different policy fields (Bretherton and Vogler 2012). Also, 
since the EUGS, the EU has advocated for a holistic approach to security that 
integrates different policy areas under the umbrella of resilience, particularly as a 
result of the growing nexus between internal and external security. Yet our division 
of these categories allows us to map dominant debates that have assessed the EU’s 
external relations in these three fields and understand the transition towards 
resilience policy frameworks. 
3.1 EU Economic Instruments in External Action 
Economic agreements (trade, cooperation, and association) and the provision of aid 
to third countries are two of the most important external action instruments of the 
EU and the most integrated ones (Smith 2014: 45–53). As emphasized by the literature 
on the EU’s trade power, the EU is not only the biggest player in global trade but also 
influences power politics by economic means (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006: 907; see 
also Smith 2016): 
The Union is not only a formidable power in trade. It is also becoming a power 
through trade, using access to its huge market as a bargaining chip to obtain changes 
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in the domestic policies of its trading partners, from labour standards to human 
rights, and more generally to shape new patterns of global governance.  
Moreover, scholars have noted the emergence of “new trade politics” in the EU 
(Young and Peterson 2006), accompanied by an EU commitment towards deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreements (Laursen and Roederer-Rynning 2017: 764). 
This trend is characterized by increasing legalization (with more precisely defined 
rules, dispute resolution, and sanctions, for instance), closer linkage of trade and 
domestic policy, a changing international context (featuring an increasingly 
multipolar system, for instance), a greater variety of issues (such as investment and 
intellectual property), and the inclusion of more actors (such as parliaments) in trade 
policy (Orbie and Kerremans 2013; Young and Peterson 2015). As a consequence of the 
greater involvement of parliaments and civil society, trade has become increasingly 
politicized and contested (Laursen and Roederer-Rynning 2017: 765; Orbie and 
Kerremans 2013: 494). 
The EU has reacted to the questioning of the legitimacy of its international trade 
policy by actors such as NGOs and national parliaments by attempting to promote 
the “social dimension of globalization” and seeking to promote labour standards 
through trade (Kerremans and Orbie 2009: 630). Furthermore, the EU is attempting to 
improve the connection between trade policies and development, recommending 
both the expansion of liberal democratic norms and a pro-poor development agenda 
to assist low-income countries. However, some observers have criticized the EU for 
not having a clear vision of how to put the trade-development nexus into practice, 
noting that it preaches free trade and development while also pursuing commercial 
interests and protecting its market from external competition (Carbone and Orbie 
2014: 7). 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004 and revised in 2015 
with the intention to integrate the EU’s relations with near neighbours, has been 
analysed as a key economic and financial instrument to achieve political goals. The 
need for security and stability are seen to be the central drivers of EU policies, which 
target diverse state and non-state actors (Bicchi 2007; Roccu and Voltolini 2018). The 
prospect of access to the EU market or the provision of financial support through the 
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) are used as incentives for reform (Bouris 
and Schumacher 2017: 15; Poli 2016: 41; Roccu and Voltolini 2018: 12). Furthermore, the 
EU's Neighbourhood Policy is employed both to address crises in the neighbourhood 
and to stabilize the EU itself by addressing internal vulnerabilities (Johansson-
Nogués 2018). 
The trade power of the EU’s external relations has not gone unnoticed by critical 
analysts. For instance, in his Foucauldian analysis of EU resilience governance, 
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Joseph (2014) identifies political economy as the main tool in the promotion of 
economic modernization and the mechanism of governing “from a distance” (Joseph 
2014: 286; Korosteleva 2018: 6). Other critical scholars have looked at the effects of the 
EU’s promotion of market liberalization in the neighbourhood countries, assessing 
the extent to which the policies have brought stability and prosperity. When 
examining the Southern Neighbourhood in particular, some authors have criticized 
the destabilizing effects of EU policies on local economies (Bicchi 2014; Bouris and 
Schumacher 2017; Dodini and Fantini 2006; Gstöhl 2015; Langan 2015; Poli 2016; 
Roccu and Voltolini 2018). According to Katsaris (2016), the risk of adverse effects due 
to the EU’s promotion of market reforms stems from the systemic differences that 
exist between the EU’s economy and those of neighbouring countries. 
In addition to trade as a foreign policy instrument, the EU offers financial assistance 
to third countries in the aftermath of shocks (Poli 2016: 44). Some scholars have 
focused on how European integration or the principle of policy coherence have 
affected development initiatives (Carbone 2008; Holland and Doidge 2007; Orbie and 
Carbone 2016), while others have focused on the EU’s evolving relations with 
developing countries (Söderbaum and Stalgren 2009). It is only recently that aid-
related financial tools have explicitly aimed at enhancing resilience, as seen for 
example in the EU Trust Funds (EUTF). These respond to the EU’s need to create 
swift, more flexible, and effective joint responses to emergencies and seek to 
facilitate the transition towards the development and resilience of developing 
countries (Crowe 2017: 442–443). For instance, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for 
Africa supports economic and resilience governance practices and assists on issues 
of mobility; the Bekou Trust Fund assists with stabilization and reconstruction in the 
Central African Republic, and the Madad Fund fosters the resilience of Syrian 
refugees in EU neighbourhood countries having primarily supported educational 
projects (Carrera et al. 2018: 72; Maass 2017: 239–240). 
However, several limitations of these funds have been identified: firstly, 
contributions by member states have been limited, in particular for the Madad Fund 
(Hauck et al. 2015: 8). Secondly, negotiations within the trust funds are complex due 
to the variety of actors and interests involved, e.g., the different Directorate Generals 
of the European Commission (Castillejo 2016: 6–7; Maass 2017: 240). Most projects are 
implemented in cooperation with national organizations, international agencies, and 
non-governmental organizations, often undermining project effectiveness (Carrera 
et al. 2018: 71, 75; Hauck et al. 2015: 12). Thirdly, some authors argue that member 
states lobby for certain funds and not others, overlooking local priorities and 
knowledge, and resulting in development processes that are insufficiently tied to 
partnerships and ownership (Castillejo 2016: 12–14). 
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The literature has recently identified two aspects in which the EU’s economic policies 
in external relations are increasingly contested. The first is domestic political 
opposition in member states that have different trade preferences and positions (Van 
Loon 2018). The second is the contestation emerging at the international level. For 
example, the EU’s attempt to reach comprehensive free trade agreements with 
Eastern Partnership countries is challenged by Russia, which has different and 
sometimes opposed priorities and geo-strategic interests (Gstöhl 2015: 864; Hoekman 
2017: 371; see also Calus 2018). 
As a response to CO, the main instrument of the EU is sanctions, as these can be 
imposed “on states that pose a threat to the EU and/or the international community” 
(Young and Peterson 2015: 839) and per definition are responses to “objectionable 
behaviour” (Portela 2017: 270). Sanctions are considered an instrument of liberal 
governance, which is applied coercively in response to a violation of international 
laws, principles, or norms (Korosteleva 2018: 6; Poli 2016: 48–49). Sanctions are also 
used to discourage authoritarian leaders or practices – from violent actions against 
minorities to actors challenging the territorial integrity of a country – and thus 
enhance democratic transitions (Poli 2016: 50; Portela 2017: 276). In the context of 
secessions, sanctions can be applied to non-state entities, although this is rather 
uncommon (Poli 2016: 53–54). It has been noted that the purposes of sanctions seem 
to differ depending on the neighbourhoods they are applied to: whereas sanctions 
have been used to promote democracy in the East, in the Southern neighbourhood 
they have been imposed as a result of concerns about international security (Portela 
2017: 276–277). 
3.2 EU Political Instruments to Address International Conflict 
Political instruments include a wide variety of diplomatic and military policies (from 
strategic partnerships, démarches, and diplomatic recognition to arms embargoes, 
civilian and military interventions, or the Instrument Contributing to Stability and 
Peace) to address conflicts and crises in the international sphere (for a full list, see 
Smith 2014: 54–64). Most of the political instruments that the EU employs have 
generated debate on a case-by-case basis. For example, the EU–South Africa Strategic 
Partnership has been evaluated in terms of gains in economic and political relations, 
peace, and security (see the special issue by Masters and Hierro [2017]). Diplomatic 
recognition of Kosovo as an independent state or as a province of Serbia has 
generated disagreements among member states and undermined the EU’s coherence, 
as discussed in several studies (Dessus et al. 2017; Ker-Lindsay and Armakolas 2017). 
As James Ker-Lindsay (2015) notes, it is key that the EU and its members learn how to 
pursue diplomatic relations with areas of contested statehood like Kosovo, the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia, or Eastern Ukraine. 
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Enlargement is considered one of the most successful political instruments to effect 
reforms in liberal democratic institutions and governance effectiveness and thus 
gradually improve the political, socio-economic, and security conditions of new EU 
members (Börzel and Schimmelfennig 2017; Börzel and Sedelmeier 2017; Grabbe 
2014). Over the decades, the material and ideational incentives that are offered when 
entering the Union – from economic benefits to ethnic conflict mediation and 
democratic certainties – have been used to expand from six initial members to 
twenty-eight, without counting the UK's exit (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2002; 
Schimmelfennig 2005). 
Yet, the transformative power of enlargement is seen to be waning both because of 
internal contestation – divergences among member states and also in their domestic 
politics, especially with the rise of right wing populist parties that have mobilized 
public opinion – and challenges from the outside, as critiques of the European Union 
burgeon (Dimitrova and Kortenska 2017; Grabbe 2014). The possibilities for 
expanding the Union have dimmed. The early optimism with the prospects of 
Turkey’s integration has withered (Müftüler-Baç 2008), mainly due to Turkey’s 
increasingly authoritarian leanings, missed opportunities to reach agreements, and 
growing scepticism and bilateral disputes among member states (Phinnemore and 
İçener 2016; Turhan 2016). Therefore, most of the focus is on the possibility of 
enlarging through the remaining countries in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia), although the 
divergent positions among member states on the prospects for enlargement present 
a complex picture (Epstein and Jacoby 2013; Ker-Lindsay et al. 2017; Vachudova 2013). 
Following the end of the Cold War, the EU gradually sought to assume further 
responsibilities in the fields of conflict and crisis management and peace-related 
activities with the support of civilian and military forces. In 1999, after a Franco-
British summit in St. Malo, France, the ESDP was launched, enabling EU members to 
undertake joint military and civilian actions. Whereas, initially, military 
interventions were meant to focus on conflict prevention and restoring peace and 
security efforts through the use of force, civilian missions drew on civilian 
capabilities, including rule of law, civil protection and administration, policing, crisis 
management, and monitoring (for overviews of institutional development, see 
Bossong and Benner [2012]; Bossong [2013]; Engberg [2014]). 
These tasks and the coordination at the EU level expanded under the Lisbon Treaty, 
which, for example, explicitly mentioned “peacekeeping” and encompassed “joint 
disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and 
assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, [and] tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization” 
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(see article 43). Again the EUGS served to further coordinate and give new impetus to 
other military instruments, like the EU Battlegroups, which enable the EU to respond 
rapidly and independently with small-scale units (Reykers 2016). Since the first 
policing mission was launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU has run more than 
thirty missions and operations in the framework of the ESDP first and the CSDP 
today, seventeen of which are still ongoing. In total, eight have been military 
operations with an executive mandate, which means that they are authorized to 
intervene forcefully to stop violence if it is deemed necessary (Engberg 2014; Nováky 
2018). 
Most debates on political instruments have evaluated how these have been applied to 
specific cases. For example, civilian and military interventions in the Balkans (in 
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia) have struggled to be seen as legitimate by local 
actors, a factor which decisively influences the effective functioning of the missions 
(Gippert 2016; see also Wolff 2018). The largest civilian mission ever operationalized, 
the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), launched in 2008 to assist Kosovo in 
establishing sustainable governing institutions (Dijkstra 2011), has received diverse 
criticisms. Some studies have emphasized the difficulties and tensions experienced 
by the mission when attempting to act coherently and efficiently (Greiçevci 2012; 
Kirchner 2013; Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012), while others have underlined local 
resistances and the negative effects of the mission on the population (Bargués-
Pedreny 2016; Qehaja and Prezelj 2017; Visoka 2011). 
The EU missions in the African continent have also received notable attention. 
Unlike the large-scale and ambitious UN interventions, these are characterized by 
targeted and tailored operations and missions with a narrow focus (Brosig 2014), 
increasingly prioritizing – at least in sub-Saharan Africa – “deterrence” or “regional 
integration” and support for local processes over invasive actions (Haastrup 2013; 
Kluth 2013; see, also, Nováky 2018). Other debates assessing EU missions in North 
Africa discuss the links between the tasks of conflict prevention and peacebuilding 
with broader concerns of European stability, security, and migration management 
(see the special issue edited by Bauer [2013]; also Geddes [2015]). 
Another important theme in the literature is the EU’s increasing commitment to 
engage with bottom-up initiatives in foreign interventions (both civilian and 
military) to transfer ownership and help develop locally-owned security sector 
reforms and peacebuilding projects (Ejdus and Juncos 2018). This is perceived in a 
variety of contexts, from the Border Assistance mission to Moldova and Ukraine, 
which seeks to build confidence among parties and change perceptions about 
conflict, to the inclusive peacebuilding approach taken by EU missions in Mali and 
the Sahel (Dias 2013; Jayasundara-Smits 2018). 
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In the last few years, the emphasis on bottom-up processes has intensified, 
particularly since the adoption of the EUGS and the increasing emphasis on the idea 
of “resilience” (Tocci 2016), with the EU decisively abandoning a priori blueprints and 
goals and building instead on local resources and understandings to find more 
pragmatic solutions (Juncos 2017; Wagner and Anholt 2016). This approach, according 
to Wagner and Anholt, represents “a perfect middle ground between over-ambitious 
liberal peacebuilding and the under-ambitious objective of stability” (2016: 415). 
Although some authors consider that “the shift to the local” is merely a rhetorical 
move which has not been reflected in practice (Ejdus 2017; Ejdus 2018; Rayroux and 
Wilén 2014), the idea is to evolve from a top-down implementation of local 
ownership, in which local actors implement externally designed objectives, to a 
process of cooperation and partnership between the EU and diverse local actors 
(Bargués-Pedreny 2018: 77–90; Ejdus 2017: 465). 
3.3 EU Instruments to Address Migration 
In 2015, the EU adopted the European Agenda on Migration “to build up a coherent 
and comprehensive approach to reap the benefits and address the challenges 
deriving from migration” (EC 2015: 2). Since then, a multitude of new instruments 
have been introduced to respond quickly and more coherently, including the EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) and the Migration Partnership Framework 
(for an overview, see Castillejo 2016). Whereas migration was not mentioned in the 
European Security Strategy in 2003, it figured prominently in the EUGS in 2016 as 
both challenge and opportunity (Ceccorulli and Lucarelli 2017). 
Knoll and de Weijer (2016) note that the objective of these frameworks is European 
security through containment strategies that prevent flows of irregular migrants 
into Europe, mainly by improving border management, strengthening surveillance, 
and combating smuggling networks. In a joint meeting in Paris in August 2017, the 
EU ‒ together with France, Germany, Italy, and Spain ‒ again stressed the need to 
protect migrants, prevent departures from countries of origin, facilitate returns to 
home countries, and fight against migrant smugglers (Bundesregierung 2017). At the 
same time, it was stated that migration requires long-term efforts and consistent 
plans for joint action in order to address the root causes of irregular migration and 
promote sustainable development, inclusive growth, and community resilience 
(Bundesregierung 2017). In sum, the intention is to combine short-term strategies 
with longer-term aid and commitment that also rely on other instruments like 
partnerships, civilian missions, or the European Development Fund (EDF). 
The assumptions that migration implies an increase in criminality, regional 
economic and political instability, and grievances against the people on the move 
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and that containment is therefore the most efficient strategy to address these 
problems are contested in the literature. As Reitano and Shaw (2015: 21) argue: 
Migration has proved a resilience strategy for the vulnerable populations living in 
the countries across the Sahelian band […] The facilitated movement of people was 
considered a positive economic opportunity, which was broadly overlooked by the 
states through which the migrants transited, and thus became closely ingrained into 
the economies of the border towns along the route. 
Ranieri and Rossi (2017: 24) also observe that “seasonal patterns of rural flight and of 
regional migration (most notably towards North Africa) represent a key strategy to 
cope with the dry season in places like Mali and Niger”. They consider migration and 
smuggling an opportunity and suggest that migration may even “contribute to 
states’ security” and “regional stability”, as it “represents an alternative to taking up 
arms” (Ranieri and Rossi 2017: 11). Similarly, Molenaar and Kamouni-Janssen (2017: 
14) contend that cross-border migration can be considered a “coping strategy to deal 
with climatic challenges that serves to dampen the harshest shocks to peoples’ 
livelihoods”. Venturi underlines the need for cross-border mobility as an important 
factor of development, accusing the EU of lacking a “deep understanding of local 
social and economic dynamics, such as regional mobility” (2017: 123).  
Other scholars have analysed European migration policies in the context of broader 
EU-African Union (AU) relations, particularly after adopting the Joint Valletta Action 
Plan (2015) to strengthen cooperation between the two. According to a variety of 
studies, the EU migration policies have been adopted in the context of 
fundamentally contrasting interests of the EU and AU: while the former focuses on 
containing migration movements before they reach European shores, the latter has 
an interest in increasing legal migration routes to Europe (ICG 2017; Mackie et al. 
2017). Castillejo argues that the shift to bilateral transactional engagement has 
caused “deep frustrations” (2017: 33) and soured relations between the EU and AU. In 
addition, International Crisis Group (2017: 9) claims that the EU’s decision to relocate 
EDF funds to the EUTF has led to disappointment and frustration among the 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa. 
Another tension seems to be the contrast between the short-termism of EU migration 
policies and the tendency within the AU to see migration as a structural 
phenomenon that has long-term implications (Barana 2017: 2; Mackie et al. 2017: 10). 
Authors point out that the root causes of migration cannot be addressed with policies 
of containment like policing and border control mechanisms but require more 
complex and lengthy processes which understand the phenomenon holistically, as 
linked to broader problems of development and peacebuilding (Clemens and Postel 
2018; Gowan 2017; van der Lijn 2017). As Gowan (2017) explains, without civilian crisis 
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management efforts, the cycles of violence affecting the Sahel and Horn of Africa 
will likely persevere, rendering the strategies to contain migration futile. 
While protection and security may be achieved through short-term measures, 
current policies might also “backfire in the long term” (Knoll and de Weijer 2016: 28; 
see also Barana 2017; Molenaar and Kamouni-Janssen 2017). Examining the cases of 
Niger and Mali, Bergmann et al. (2017) find that increased capacity for border 
management has aggravated the vulnerabilities of migrants by, for instance, easing 
situations of abuse, pushing them to take more precarious routes, or limiting their 
right to seek asylum. Again, this contrasts with the preferences of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which sees free movement as a means 
to stimulate economic and social dynamics in the wider region and controverts long-
term peace strategies (Mackie et al. 2017: 8). 
This point is also made concerning EU operations like EUNAVFOR MED operation 
Sophia, the naval mission to respond to the migration issue that, for example, takes 
unwavering measures against human smuggling activities (Johansen 2017; 
Riddervold 2018). Feyock (2016) argues that these actions will have a limited impact 
as long as no stability is achieved in Libya. Micallef and Reitano confirm this view 
when they see conflict and instability as “fundamental stumbling blocks to the long-
term sustainable management of migratory flows in the central Mediterranean” 
(2017: 16–17). They conclude that current policies to contain migration movements in 
Libya have prolonged political instability. Assessing migration in northern Niger, 
Molenaar and Kamouni-Janssen warn against securitized measures that are 
insensitive to local conflict dynamics, especially concerning inter-tribal rivalries, 
and argue for a longer-term approach that “recognizes regional stability as a 
prerequisite” (2017: 1) for the development of migration policies in the region. 
Other authors critique the EU’s current longer-term perspective (which runs in 
parallel to short-term mechanisms, as stated in its policy documents). The migration-
development nexus adopted by the EU is based on the assumption that fostering 
economic development in countries of origin and transit can contain migration. 
Most actors have questioned this perspective. As Clemens and Postel assert, 
“evidence that aid can greatly and sustainably deter emigration from poor countries 
is weak at best” (2018: 15). De Haas also finds that economic development has a “U-
curve effect” (2010: 39) on migration, as it only starts decreasing after a long period of 
sustained economic growth. Consequently, Ranieri and Rossi conclude that the 
current migration-development narrative promoted by the EU is “utterly 
misleading” (2017: 20). 
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4. THE RISE OF RESILIENCE IN MEMBER STATES’ FOREIGN POLICY 
This fourth section explores how resilience is gradually permeating the foreign 
policy of EU member states. It focuses on the policies of Germany, France, and Italy, 
as it is these that have sparked public attention and academic debate. A key 
observation is that, while a resilience paradigm is still incipient, it is increasingly 
apparent in the foreign policy documents of Germany and France, particularly in 
their development and humanitarian agendas, whereas it has been largely absent 
from Italy’s foreign policy approach, which has focussed mainly on containing 
migration. The section is divided into three parts: The first discusses Germany’s 
approach to development cooperation and humanitarian policies, through which it 
has increasingly adopted a mixture of short term and long-term strategies to 
enhance resilience. The second looks at France’s foreign policy, which is 
transitioning from prioritising the state and governmental institutions towards 
emphasising processes that strengthen civil society and the private sector to 
facilitate societal resilience to humanitarian crises. Finally, we examine Italy’s 
approach to foreign policy, which in recent years has been shaped primarily by 
migration concerns. Rather than measures to promote resilience, the focus has been 
on strategies of containment that parallel some of the policies adopted by the EU. 
4.1 Resilience in Germany’s Development and Humanitarian Policies 
Being rooted in ecological debates on natural hazards and climate change (Birkmann 
2008; Greiving and Fleischhauer 2012), resilience is gradually understood in the 
German context as an instrument of humanitarian assistance and development 
cooperation. According to Müller (2011), a more comprehensive understanding of the 
concept, as comprising aspects of societal and regional vulnerabilities, is relatively 
recent, and has led to a gradual popularization of the term in the German academic 
and policy debate. The German Federal Foreign Office (FFO), for example, locates 
strengthening resilience in its policies of both “humanitarian assistance and long-
term development cooperation through recovery and rehabilitation” (2012: 7). Yet a 
resilience approach has not been integrated systematically into the existing foreign 
policy tools of the FFO. Resilience is mentioned in the new German guidelines on 
preventing crises, resolving conflicts, and building peace, but it is not linked to 
specific (foreign) policy instruments and generally refers to the capacities of states 
and societies to cope with crisis and violent conflict (Federal Government of 
Germany 2017). 
In 2014, the FFO established a new Directorate-General for Conflict Prevention, 
Stabilization, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, which works with and on doctrines of 
stabilization (Rotmann and Steinacker 2014). This stabilization focus is the subject of 
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debate, as is the FFO’s approach to crisis prevention within the Directorate-General, 
which is a structural, long-term perspective including implicit notions of fostering 
resilience in societies targeted for intervention. Comparing the conceptual visions of 
stabilization of Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, Rotmann finds that the German FFO often employs a narrow approach 
to stabilization as an “urgent effort to prevent and overcome emergency situations of 
extreme political volatility and large-scale organized violence. Such emergencies 
may remain acute for many years” (Rotmann 2016: 14). This stabilization approach 
does not explicitly reference resilience-building but implies a shift from 
stabilization-as-peacebuilding to stabilization-as-crisis-management. This means 
that interventions do not see fragile state institutions as problems in need of 
statebuilding but as normalcy with which local populations will have to cope, with 
international support, for decades (2016: 11). As Rotmann (2016: 5) notes: 
[T]he kind of stability sought here is no more than the absence of acute crises or, 
phrased positively, resilience to political shocks. Resilience implies a dynamic vision 
of stability in which political structures are adaptable to shifting demands and 
changing distributions of power, capable of assuming a minimum level of 
responsibility in the international system. 
This implies a minimal approach of “defusing crisis” that is realistic, responsible, 
and flexible, and differs from the former ambitious goal of democratic statebuilding 
(Rotmann 2016). This approach parallels the pragmatism embraced in the EU’s 
external action as a strategy to influence indirectly and adapt to a complex 
international arena in which Western liberal norms are contested (Chandler 2014; 
Joseph 2018; Juncos 2017). 
German Humanitarian Assistance, which is also handled by the FFO and supports 
projects like the Nansen Initiative and the Platform on Disaster Displacement, refers 
more explicitly to resilience-building when it comes to disaster preparedness in view 
of sudden-onset shocks, recurrent or long-term stresses, and forecast-based 
financing. These approaches focus on enhancing the resilience of systems, rather 
than of individuals. This understanding of resilience is rooted in concepts of 
adaptation and capacity building, while also aiming at reducing underlying factors 
of vulnerability (health, food security, water and sanitation, etc.). This perspective is 
also reflected in the publications of the German Red Cross (GRC), which is a major 
actor in the elaboration of a German approach to resilience in a humanitarian 
context (GRC 2014). 
The centrality of resilience to Germany’s foreign policy framework follows the EUGS, 
which is meant to be integrated into the national policies of member states, and is 
itself connected to broader international concerns about the need to work on 
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“prevention” and “sustainability” (Bernstein 2018). This tendency is amplified by the 
traditional orientation of German foreign policy towards international cooperation, 
multilateralism, and a pro-active approach to European integration (Klein 2018: 229). 
The German seat in the Security Council for the period 2019–2020 is seen as an 
opportunity for the German government to foreground conceptual work on conflict 
prevention, stabilization, post-conflict peacebuilding, and promoting peaceful and 
inclusive societies. 
Drawing on existing DFID/EU definitions of resilience, the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has incorporated the concept in 
pertinent policy papers, discussing resilience at the individual and the community 
levels, as well as in the context of building inclusive institutions (e.g., in Agenda 2030 
and the SDGs). Furthermore, the BMZ has commissioned policy-oriented research on 
resilience in crisis contexts (Mosel and Levine 2014a; Mosel and Levine 2014b). 
According to Joseph (2017), the BMZ approach to resilience is to strengthen existing 
coping mechanisms in the partner countries. He finds that the BMZ combines an 
emphasis on people’s capacity to recover from stress situations with the more 
traditional focus on institutional capacity building (Joseph 2017: 12). He also detects 
differences between the German and the Anglo-Saxon approaches to resilience: the 
Anglo-Saxon approach implies governing populations from a distance while 
encouraging self-responsibility and entrepreneurial behaviour by communities to 
adapt to crisis and shocks, whereas the German understanding is less individualistic 
and seeks to strengthen already existing societal and statist coping mechanisms in 
the neighbouring countries (see also Joseph 2018). Such nuances of approach when 
conceptualising resilience also play a role in French foreign policy (see 4.2 below). 
Camacho and Kreibaum (2017) argue that, in the context of German development 
policy, resilience is generally operationalized in the form of innovative financial 
programming and cash-based interventions (CBIs). This is also reflected in the BMZ’s 
support to the “InsuResilience Global partnership”, which is an instrument for 
climate and disaster risk finance and insurance solutions. CBIs combine short-term, 
labour intensive tasks with local infrastructure projects, which in turn can contribute 
to livelihood development and disaster prevention. Germany has implemented CBIs 
in, for example, Afghanistan, Northern Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, and Nepal (Camacho 
and Kreibaum 2017: 11). Sometimes, these measures are accompanied by 
microfinance/SME or business training interventions. Recent CBIs mostly focus on 
enhancing employment opportunities for Syrian refugees in the countries 
neighbouring Syria. While most of these initiatives are implemented by the official 
German cooperation agencies, i.e., the German Corporation for International 
Cooperation (GIZ) and the Credit Institute for Reconstruction (KfW), Germany also 
finances multilateral cash-based programmes of specialized UN agencies and funds. 
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These interventions usually target societal resilience. Camacho and Kreibaum (2017) 
also report recent tendencies in the German FFO to encourage NGOs to work with 
CBIs. Yet, CBIs remain a minor sector within German development cooperation. 
Furthermore, resilience features prominently in the Transitional and Development 
Assistance (TDA) instrument, which takes a longer-term approach to enhancing the 
recovery of populations in areas affected by conflict. This instrument focuses on 
linking humanitarian and development interventions (Mosel and Levine 2014a). TDA 
addresses transition processes, filling the void between short-term relief and long-
term development measures and aiming explicitly at fostering resilience through 
rehabilitation of social and productive infrastructures, disaster reduction, re-
integration of refugees, and food security. 
4.2 From Robustness to Resilience in French Foreign Policy 
As in the case of Germany, the French term ‘résilience’ had been established in other 
disciplines such as ecology, physics, psychology, and geography (Blanc and Nicolas 
2013; Koffi 2014) before it eventually reached policies and political science. The 
notion first entered the policy discourse on defence and national security, and 
subsequently expanded to development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. 
While resilience was initially conceived as robustness, centring on strengthening 
state capacities and responses, it has recently broadened in scope and now refers to a 
form of governance that includes a variety of actors and societal processes (Bourcart 
2015). Yet research has been rather limited (primarily assessing France’s attempts to 
foster its own resilience in national policy areas), thus neglecting how the French 
may support resilience in ALS/CO through development and humanitarian policies. 
Whereas the term resilience has remained largely absent from the policy discourse 
on counter-terrorism (Joseph 2018: 69) – the exception being the 2016 Action Plan 
against radicalization and terrorism (Premier Ministre 2016) – it has been prominent 
in defence and national security policy. Resilience was mentioned for the first time 
in the French 2008 White Paper (Présidence de la République 2008: 59–60) where it is 
defined as the 
determination and the capacity of a country, a society and a government to withstand 
the consequences of a major aggression or disaster, and then rapidly to restore their 
capacity to function normally or at least in a socially acceptable manner. This 
concerns not only government, but the whole of civil society and all actors in the 
economy. 
This definition reveals that resilience is understood as resistance or robustness, in 
contrast to the Anglo-Saxon dominant viewpoint, which suggests that “crises should 
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be seen as opportunities not to return to how things were, but to reorganize how we 
operate” (Joseph 2018: 54). Unlike in the US and UK literature, there is no in-depth 
discussion of either governance or community and individual preparedness in 
French defence and national security policy (Joseph 2013: 256). 
Instead, France’s conception of security and risk prevention remains state-centric: 
despite references to the social dimension of resilience, the White Paper clearly 
focuses on public authorities’ capabilities (Joseph 2018: 53). Similar to Germany, 
France has traditionally followed an interventionist approach, led by the state and 
government, which emphasizes solidarity and national cohesion and offers little 
space for bottom-up resilience building by individuals and communities (Joseph 
2013: 261; 2018: 177). This “acts against the Anglo-Saxon appeal to specific enterprising 
groups and individuals” (Joseph 2018: 179). On the White Book’s website, however, a 
government’s explanatory note elaborates on the “new concept” of resilience and 
points to the relevance of local authorities, civil society, and the private sector. By 
stating that resilience is not only an objective of the state but also a state of society, 
and by emphasizing the need to increase awareness among citizens, the text 
represents a step towards a form of governance that operates through more bottom-
up societal practices and processes (Présidence de la République 2008; Joseph 2013: 
257). Also, regarding critical infrastructure protection, Joseph observes “a gradual 
transition from a strong form of state protection to a greater devolution of powers to 
the private sector and non-state actors” (2018: 93) since the mid-2000s, although this 
has not developed in a uniform manner. 
Joseph finds that the reason for the French reluctance to embrace the idea of 
resilience is its Anglo-Saxon origin and its connection to a neoliberal rationality of 
governance. He suggests that France’s top-down and centralized administrative 
processes and the republican tradition of its political discourse impede the 
consolidation of the resilience concept outside the realm of security strategies. 
Furthermore, there is a less positive view of the private sector than in the UK: 
cooperation with private actors is often seen as inevitable rather than desirable. 
While the state is no longer perceived as the exclusive provider, it should always be 
ready to intervene, or at least coordinate, regulate, and facilitate (Bourcart 2015). Even 
when the French state tries to devolve some power to private and municipal actors, 
these show only limited interest in assuming responsibilities – a passivity that might 
have been created by the state operating through decrees and legally binding 
guidelines (Joseph 2018: 177). However, Joseph suggests that the introduction of 
resilience in the French security discourse and its recognition in responses to the 
2008 White Paper prepare the ground for the inclusion of resilience as a form of 
governance “from a distance” (2018: 70) in the future. Also, the idea of resilience is 
strongly promoted by French think tanks, foundations, and research institutes, 
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which seem to be closer to Anglo-Saxon understandings (Joseph 2018: 98). 
The shift towards an interpretation of resilience beyond a state-centric logic can be 
noted in the French policy discourses on foreign and development policies, which are 
closely intertwined in France. In 1999, the cooperation ministry was integrated into 
the foreign ministry, where the Directorate General for Globalization, Culture, 
Education and International Development (DGM) is now responsible for these 
matters. Politicians have also reflected this shift in their pronouncements. For 
instance, former foreign minister Bernard Kouchner has described development aid 
as a key dimension of diplomacy (Direction de l’information légale et administrative 
2007). The guidelines for French development policies are set by the Interministerial 
Committee for International Cooperation and Development (CICID), which is chaired 
by the Prime Minister (Moreau and Kap-Herr 2008). 
Policies of fostering resilience are understood as part of the French response to 
situations of fragility (MEAE 2018: 20). The notion of fragility emerged prior to the 
idea of resilience and therefore deserves close attention. Being the first of its kind, 
the strategy document “Fragile States and Situations of Fragility: France’s Policy 
Paper” addresses both state and societal fragility, but concludes that, in fragile 
societies, it is the state that “needs to be the guardian, arbiter and regulator of public 
interest, equity and equality of all citizens” (CICID 2007: 2). This publication was 
followed by a number of government papers on different aspects related to fragility 
as well as to some remarkable institutional dynamics. In 2008, the Crisis Centre was 
established within the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs. It was renamed the 
Crisis and Support Centre in 2014, when divisions for stabilization, humanitarian 
action, and anticipation were added. Several measures were taken in order to 
improve the coordination of security and development policies among the ministries 
charged with foreign, interior, and defence affairs, e.g., the creation of a new 
Interministerial Committee for Strategic Direction (MEAE 2018: 11–12). 
Another announcement of the 2007 strategy was translated into action in 2016, when 
the CICID approved the creation of the Peace and Resilience Fund as a new 
instrument for dealing with crisis situations in fragile regions. In this way, the 
French Development Agency (AFD), which implements policies defined by the French 
Government through the support of development projects, was provided with 
additional financial resources. The criteria that have to be met for funding include 
the degree to which the respective area is exposed to major shocks, the capacities at 
hand to cope with them, the likelihood that tensions or shocks spread, and the 
relative benefits for France and the AFD. The fund is organized in regional 
programmes called “initiatives”. In 2017, four of these had been launched – in the 
Sahel, the Middle East, the Central-African Republic, as well as the countries in the 
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lake Chad region (MEAE 2018: 29). The fact that local institutions, NGOs, and private 
actors can apply for funding (AFD 2018) indicates a certain shift towards the Anglo-
Saxon approach to resilience, putting more emphasis on the role of civil society, 
communities, and individuals and going beyond building the capacities of the 
central government (Joseph 2018: 54). This also becomes apparent when having a 
closer look at the fund’s nine priority axes, which include aid to overcome collective 
and individual trauma, help for displaced persons, the provision of health care for 
vulnerable people, and the improvement of opportunities for young people through 
education and vocational training (AFD 2018). However, it remains to be seen 
whether these changes will become consolidated, embracing the Anglo-Saxon 
understanding of resilience, or if these new partnerships will eventually have to 
subordinate themselves to the French top-down administrative tradition and 
centralization, where civil society and the private sector play a less active role (Joseph 
2013: 261; 2018: 175). 
In 2018, the MEAE – more precisely, the DGM – published an update of the 
aforementioned 2007 strategy, entitled “Prevention, Resilience, and Sustainable 
Peace, 2018–2022”. It describes the context of its publication as a multiplication of 
fragility dynamics at the global level (MEAE 2018: 7). According to the paper, the 
main objective is to establish sustainable peace in fragile states by realizing the 
sixteenth goal of Agenda 2030, which refers to peace, justice, and strong institutions. 
Therefore, a central role is dedicated to prevention and fostering resilience before, 
during, and after crises, seeking to address root causes. This is to be achieved 
through contributions from diplomacy, security, development, stabilization, and 
humanitarian aid. Moreover, French interventions are to draw on the five goals of 
peace and state consolidation mentioned in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile 
States: legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and 
services (MEAE 2018: 7). 
The French approach to fragility focuses on strengthening the social contract 
between state and society, assuming that, to be sustainable, development and 
stability have to be subordinated to democratic governance. While the strategy does 
not present a list of fragile states, it elaborates the criteria that determine whether or 
not France shall intervene, which are the same as those employed to evaluate projects 
in the Peace and Resilience Fund. Once an intervention is agreed upon, six principles 
guide France’s activities: support political and diplomatic actors who are concerned 
with fragility issues and development aid; prevent crises and their resurgence by 
fostering inclusion and resilience; draw on concerted, prospective, and dynamic 
analyses of fragilities and risks; respond in an integrated, long-term manner, taking 
into consideration different dimensions of fragility; support endogenous processes 
fostering the legitimacy and sustainability of France’s activities; and follow a rights-
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based approach (MEAE 2018: 7). 
Since fragility is deemed a multidimensional, structural, and volatile challenge that 
is present in different geographic contexts, the report pledges the mobilization of all 
available bilateral and multilateral cooperation instruments (MEAE 2018: 28). First, 
financial means for existing bilateral instruments are to be increased and new 
complementary ones created (e.g., a Stabilization Fund of the Crisis and Support 
Centre). The French focus on bilateral instruments is reflected in the fact that two 
thirds of the additional financial means for public development aid will be dedicated 
to bilateral aid, which supposedly allows more efficient support for priority 
countries. Following an integrated approach, the authors want to improve the 
coherence and synergies of the various instruments (MEAE 2018: 28). Second, these 
bilateral activities are to be complemented by multilateral institutions, and the 
relevance of the UN and its activities such as peacekeeping missions is particularly 
emphasized. France’s financial contributions are to be accompanied by a strategy of 
influencing and monitoring initiatives to ensure that both France’s and third 
countries’ preferences regarding the approach to fragility are taken into 
consideration (MEAE 2018: 29). Third, financing is to be diversified by taking into 
account (i.e., supporting and monitoring) financial sources other than public 
development aid (including private investments and the internal resources of third 
states). Moreover, the role of remittances is emphasized: these are to be canalized 
towards investment in productive activities instead of in everyday consumption 
(MEAE 2018: 30). 
In terms of methods, the text elaborates four key elements of the strategy’s 
implementation. First, the strategy underlines the role of inter-agency coordination 
between humanitarian aid, development, and security (e.g., in the form of CICID, task 
forces, etc.). In particular, the early warning system SyAI of the Anticipation and 
Partnerships Mission – a division within the Crisis and Support Centre – is explained 
in detail, as this is to allow France to mobilize its means of cooperation appropriately 
(MEAE 2018: 31). Second, the strategy mentions complementary financial 
instruments, technical assistance and cooperation (MEAE 2018: 31–32). Third, France 
is to strengthen collaboration with Civil Society Organizations from the EU’s 
Southern countries, since these possess expertise such as knowledge of fragile 
contexts and mobilization capacities that is especially important in regions where 
the state is too weak to intervene. Furthermore, these organizations can also 
contribute to the elaboration, implementation, and monitoring of public policies 
(MEAE 2018: 32). Lastly, the exchange between practitioners and 
French/Francophone researchers is to be strengthened and rendered more coherent 
in order to gain further insights for decision-making and implementation (MEAE 
2018: 33). 
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Moreover, the concept of resilience plays a key role. The document’s understanding 
of resilience covers both states and societies, defining it as the capacity to absorb and 
overcome shocks, which can be limited to different degrees (MEAE 2018: 22). Hence, 
the idea of robustness is still present. Resilience-building is considered crucial 
before, during, and after crises and conflicts (MEAE 2018: 10). While the role of the 
state in fostering resilience, with regards to security and justice issues in particular, 
is still emphasized, the mobilization of local communities, the private sector, and 
civil society is also deemed necessary. Moreover, the role of the most vulnerable 
population groups (women, young people, and displaced persons) is given special 
attention (MEAE 2018: 26). Besides the case of the Peace and Resilience Fund, this is 
another indication of a shift from resilience-as-robustness (traditional French 
approach) towards resilience-as-governance (dominant Anglo-Saxon 
understanding). A similar development can be observed with regard to the French 
notion of fragility: drawing on the OECD’s definition of the term, the 2018 strategy 
recognizes that civil society and communities are crucial actors that possess valuable 
resources when it comes to tackling fragility (MEAE 2018: 7). Thus, they no longer 
need to be governed ‘from above’, as in top-down state-building approaches. 
However, the strategy does not spell out many details of how the aforementioned 
instruments are to be ideally combined in order to foster resilience. Granted, the food 
aid programme managed by the DGM is presented as an instrument supporting 
“population resilience” (MEAE 2018: 36), health as well as education are framed as 
resilience issues, and there is a list of France’s financial contributions to different 
funds (MEAE 2018: 15; 25). Nevertheless, there is no overall framework elaborating 
how existing and new instruments collectively contribute to resilience. 
Because the emergence of the resilience concept in French policies towards third 
countries has been much slower than in defence and national security policy, 
research on fostering resilience abroad is limited. For instance, the MEAE supported 
a publication on fragilities and resilience (Châtaigner 2014) in order to gain insights 
for its conceptual reflection and reorientation (MEAE 2018: 11). However, the book 
does not include an assessment of France’s foreign policy instruments strengthening 
resilience in ALS/CO. Although they appeared prior to the 2018 MEAE strategy, 
Joseph’s publications (2013; 2018) are also less in-depth when it comes to resilience in 
foreign and development policies. He finds that the AFD does not apply the concept 
“in any meaningful way”, despite its participation in events with actors that work on 
resilience-building (Joseph 2018: 151). While the agency has been mentioning the 
promotion of resilience in its strategic papers in recent years, Joseph emphasizes 
that the annual reports reveal how little this has actually affected thinking, let alone 
practice (Joseph 2018: 152). Even though resilience was only sporadically present in 
the discourse, however, “the context for a more resilience-friendly approach [has] 
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clearly already [been] outlined” (Joseph 2018: 152). For instance, the AFD has 
recognized the need to renovate the practice of development aid, improving donor 
coordination mechanisms and measures ensuring accountability. Furthermore, the 
General Commissioner for Sustainable Development has started a project on 
integrated territorial resilience, which helps various actors (including NGOs, 
communities, and private companies) to detect both sources of vulnerability and 
coping mechanisms, implying a transformation in the approach to resilience (Joseph 
2018: 152–54). 
As in the case of Germany, the recent move away from top-down and hierarchical 
forms of governance and towards more context-sensitive strategies in French policy-
making might be – at least partly – a result of similar developments in the EU’s 
external action and in other multilateral forums (MEAE 2018: 22). Furthermore, as 
suggested by Joseph (2018: 154), ideas perceived as Anglo-Saxon could be less 
contentious when applied to third countries. Thus, while the French understanding 
of resilience might continue to be increasingly oriented towards British and US-
American ideas in foreign and development policies, such an orientation is more 
difficult in the areas of defence and national security. Italy, by contrast, has been 
rather disinclined to adopt the concept of resilience in its foreign policy 
programmes. 
4.3 Italian Foreign Policy: Containment Rather Than Resilience 
Whereas some authors have underlined Italy’s long tradition of adapting and being 
resilient to multiple crises (Evangelista 2018), the debate about resilience in Italy’s 
foreign policy is in its infancy. In the most recent report, the only reference to 
resilience is in relation to the need to maintain and strengthen the Euro (Greco et al. 
2018). In the last few years, Italy's foreign policy has been under immense pressure 
due to its proximity to a large number of international challenges, not only in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East, but also in Eastern Europe (Brighi 2013; Isernia 
and Longo 2017). At the same time, persisting economic stagnation (if not crisis) has 
led to a drastic decrease of resources devoted to foreign affairs and a re-orientation 
towards economic objectives. In 2014, the ministry of Foreign Affairs saw the number 
of diplomats shrink to 1,019, half the size of the German equivalent, one third of the 
French and one fourth of the British (Tramballi 2015: 116). Embassies and cultural 
institutes have been closed and opened only where it made economic sense. 
Differently from Germany and France, Italy has come to privilege a confrontational 
approach in foreign policy, with the aim of shifting the costs of adjustments onto 
partners. While it was possible in the past to suggest that Italy was aiming to punch 
above its weight (Giacomello and Verbeek 2011), the increase of domestic political 
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volatility has brought the limitations of such an approach to the fore. The new 
Giuseppe Conte government, which emerged from the 2018 elections, has so far led to 
a toughening of Italy's position on a few key priorities (Marrone 2018) in an attempt 
to score points at the international level for the domestic debate. 
This approach is most visible in one of the most contentious political issues in 
contemporary times, namely migration, which overlaps with Italy's long-standing 
engagement with the Euro-Mediterranean area (Bicchi 2007). Whereas in Germany 
the Syrian refugee crisis centred public and policy attention in mainly domestic 
terms, the focus in Italy has shifted to Italy’s foreign policy, supported by a public 
opinion in favour of addressing arrivals with a policy of refoulements and limited 
attention to human rights (see Fig. 10 in DISPOC/LAPS and IAI 2017: 17). 
The evolution of Italy's set of policy instruments occurred in three steps. First, the 
early response centred on internal adaptation mechanisms, which not only assumed 
the resilience of Italian society, but were also designed specifically to sustain welfare 
mechanisms, such as “colf” (domestic workers) and “badanti” (caregivers) (see also 
Geddes 2008). In terms of systemic resilience, then, international migration came to 
substitute the previous internal Italian pattern of South-North migration. It also 
freed Italian women, to an extent, from traditional female roles in terms of welfare 
provision. However, this approach became untenable in the context of the EU 
because Italy's decision affected the other EU member states within the Schengen 
area. At this stage, the issue centred on migration understood for labour purposes. 
The second step in this process shifted the emphasis on to externalization and was 
directly driven by increased numbers of Mediterranean arrivals, particularly after 
2014–15. The chosen approach was to secure agreement with so-called transit 
countries, of which Libya was the most important. On a bilateral basis, Italy signed a 
memorandum of understanding with the Government of National Accord (GNA) in 
2017, the main purpose of which was to stem the flow of migrants and prevent them 
from leaving Libyan territory (Greco et al. 2018). The cost of this agreement was high 
in terms of the financial support required by Libyan forces as well as in terms of 
widespread and systematic human rights abuses. The agreement led to a significant 
decrease in the number of migrants arriving to Italian coasts from Libya (there was 
an approximately 80 percent fall). 
The third and ongoing development has been linked to the reconfiguration of Italian 
domestic politics following the 2018 elections. Two parties with nationalist anti-
migration stances ‒ the Lega, previously Lega Nord (Northern League), and the M5S, 
or Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement) ‒ secured nearly 50 percent of the votes. 
While the EU had previously been understood as a ‘vincolo esterno’ (‘external 
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constraint’ on domestic politics) offering external credibility to the Italian system, it 
was now represented as the cause of Italian problems. Most notably, the Dublin 
system, which required the first country of arrival to process asylum applications, 
meant that Italy (as well as Greece) bore the brunt of arrivals. Attempts to secure a 
more equitable distribution of up to 150,000 asylum seekers across the EU were read 
as a notable failure, much to the Italian government’s chagrin. The rhetoric used by 
the M5S and Lega was distinctly Eurosceptic. Of crucial importance was the 
appointment to the position of Interior Minister of the Lega leader, Matteo Salvini, 
who adopted a very tough rhetorical approach to migration enhanced by the 
reinvention of the Lega as a nationally based and overtly nationalistic political party. 
Previously, the Lega Nord had argued for “prima il Nord” (“the North first”), but by 
2017 Salvini was calling for “prima gli italiani” (“Italians first”). The subsequent 
choice of policy instruments on migration by Salvini did not mark a significant 
change from the preceding centre-left government and has continued to rely on 
restricting access to Italian territory. But Salvini also targeted NGOs as so-called sea 
taxis ferrying migrants to Italian shores, most notably in relation to the Aquarius 
rescue boat that was forced to travel to Spain with around 55 migrants on board 
(Scherer 2018). Also, these policies have been accompanied by the multilateralism of 
external initiatives, reflecting a new alignment at the EU level with the Visegrad 
group supplemented by the Austrian coalition led by Sebastian Kurz and the new 
Italian government within which Interior Minister Salvini is a key player (Brandt 
and Reinert 2018). 
Therefore, the concept of resilience has had few appearances in the current Italian 
approach to migration since the abandonment of regularization as a policy 
instrument. Italy, like other EU members, has relied on financial incentives 
alongside development initiatives that have political stability in mind in order to 
achieve a series of political goals within countries in the Southern neighbourhood. In 
Italy’s case, these incentives have been specifically (if not uniquely) tied to the 
implementation of externalized migration controls aimed to contain the arrival of 
migrants to Europe – primarily those traveling from Libya (Breines et al. 2015). 
Countries in the Southern neighbourhood have responded accordingly, 
implementing most European demands to monitor, control, and impede migration 
flows (Brachet 2018: 22). As critics have often observed, none of these measures have 
been put into place in order to enhance long-term resilience in the region. Rather, 
these responses stand as short-term, piece-meal solutions that have often had 
negative impacts on local economies and whose goals are often rooted in Europe’s 
limited understanding of mobility practices and their organization, ultimately 
leading these plans to backfire (Knoll and de Weijer 2016: 28; Mackie et al. 2017). 
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While Italy has pledged to provide alternative economic growth models for migrant 
generating countries, as in the memorandum for understanding (MOU) by the 
Odysseus Network (2017), its attempts to dismantle and counter smuggling networks 
have altered long standing mechanisms of protection – what Ayalew Mengiste (2018) 
refers to as “communities of knowledge”. These mechanisms had historically 
provided not only improved conditions for those traveling across the region, but also 
a subsistence income for many of those facing precarious lives along the migrant 
trail and whose work provided a range of mobility services. The criminalization of 
mobility practices through Italian-funded counter-smuggling efforts have, in this 
sense, led to the incarceration and sentencing under smuggling charges of many 
men and women across the Southern neighbourhood. While Italian-funded 
initiatives are not new, this was the first time that people in Niger, for example, saw 
accusations of smuggling lead to jail sentences (Brachet 2018). Another discouraging 
consequence of Italian counter-smuggling and migration and border enforcement 
efforts can be seen in the case of Libya. Here attempts to contain attempts at 
migration into Europe have led to the proliferation of clandestine detention centres 
and camps run by a series of official and unofficial actors (Al-Arabi 2018). 
Furthermore, an estimated 700,000 to 1,000,000 migrants are being stranded in the 
country, unable to leave (IOM 2018), often forcibly detained by militias benefiting 
from the Italy-Libya MOU. 
In sum, Italy’s responses to migration reflect a broader trend in the EU that favours 
containment strategies, often dominated by short-term concerns that have negative 
effects for the people on the move and the region. Sensibilities to foster resilience do 
not permeate these instruments, which lack an understanding of the local social and 
economic dynamics of Europe’s neighbours – in this case, the markets and the 
people who had historically shaped regional and transnational mobility (Ayalew 
Mengiste 2018). 
CONCLUSION 
The EU’s external action is being affected by a changing international environment – 
from the crisis of liberalism and democracy to the economic and financial crises, 
international conflicts like Syria and Libya, to events such as the Arab Spring, 
terrorist attacks, and migration flows. Also, internally, the politicization and 
contestation of European integration by the rise of Eurosceptic right-wing parties or 
the discrepancies among member states regarding migration and security policies 
are shaping the EU’s role in international affairs. ALS/CO are here to stay and the EU 
and member states’ instruments and capacities to deal with them need careful 
examination. 
EU-LISTCO Working Paper No. 4/ October 2019 
https://www.eu-listco.net/ 
 
Does Resilience Permeate Foreign Policy? A Review of the Instruments of the EU, Germany, France, and Italy 




Today, the transformative ambition of the EU’s foreign policy seems to have 
withered away. The EU seems to be changing gears, and if during the 2000s the 
determination was to transform the world by spreading democracy and liberal 
values, in the past decade these external ambitions have decreased. The EU is 
becoming a more defensive and pragmatic actor that seeks to pursue stability and 
foster resilience while addressing multiple internal crises (Bendiek 2017; Morillas 
2019a). This shift has been captured here by reviewing the debates on the EU 
promotion of human rights, democracy, and multilateralism. In the realm of human 
rights, some authors have observed that the EU increasingly sacrifices norms to 
interests, as in, for example, its cooperation with authoritarian regimes that have 
dubious records of human rights violations (Crawford 2008; Sharshenova and 
Crawford 2017; Sicurelli 2017). Also, the EU appears to have altered the framing of 
democracy promotion, gradually prioritizing security and stability concerns and 
pragmatic arrangements over institutional and regime change (e.g., Kurki 2011; 
Schmidt 2015). Although multilateralism continues to be a priority, it is seen as ever 
more difficult to pursue in times of uncertainty, political and economic instability, 
and shifting balances of power (Barbé et al. 2016). 
In this context of hollowing ambition, this background paper has looked at how 
resilience permeates the policies and instruments that the EU and member states 
wield to deal with ALS/CO. It has argued that the EU’s economic instruments (such as 
trade, the EU's Neighbourhood Policy or development assistance) and political 
instruments (such as strategic partnerships, diplomatic relations, Enlargement 
policies or civilian and military missions) have increasingly been framed in terms of 
resilience. A key concern in the literature is that economic and financial instruments 
are subjugated to the EU’s own security and stability and, therefore, often have 
destabilizing effects on local economies (Bicchi 2014; Carbone and Orbie 2014; Dodini 
and Fantini 2006; Langan 2015; Gstöhl 2015; Bouris and Schumacher 2017). Similarly, 
the lack of solid support for bottom-up initiatives in civilian and military missions 
has been criticized and identified in the literature as one of the key remaining 
challenges for achieving peace and resilience in societies targeted for intervention 
(Ejdus 2017; Ejdus 2018; Rayroux and Wilén 2014). 
Similarly, a key observation made by this paper is that, in Germany, resilience is 
mostly understood as a concept for humanitarian and development policies, for 
example in the context of Transitional and Development Assistance and 
humanitarian assistance programmes. In these fields, Germany aims to promote the 
resilience of populations in areas affected by conflict through, for instance, 
rehabilitating socio-economic infrastructures, helping disaster recovery, mitigating 
violence, and enhancing food security. Such instruments integrate short-and long-
term needs. However, Germany has also begun to embrace resilience in the context 
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of its foreign policy – though the concept has not been incorporated systematically 
into the policies and instruments of the German FFO. These developments are 
reinforced by Germany's commitment towards international cooperation and 
multilateralism, as the idea of resilience is also gaining in importance in 
international policy forums. France also seems to have considered resilience in its 
recent foreign and humanitarian policies ‒ although timidly and without a 
consolidation of the framework in other sectors. This is remarkable, particularly 
when considering the French preference for top-down administrative and 
centralized models of governance, where civil society and the private sector play a 
less active role. Today, however, France seems more inclined to facilitate resilience 
before, during, and after crises and conflicts, fostering the participation of local 
communities and private actors. 
Migration has been the third policy area examined in this paper both at the EU level 
and at the level of member states’ foreign policy. In contrast to the French and 
German foreign policy documents, where migration was less important, it has 
sparked a particularly heated debate in Italy. In dealing with the recent migration 
flows coming from North African countries and from the Middle East, the EU has 
prevented flows of irregular migrants into Europe by means of containment 
strategies, such as improving border management, policing, and surveillance, and 
combating smuggling networks (Knoll and de Weijer 2016). Similarly, Italy has 
addressed migration issues through control tactics and border enforcement, 
preventing migrants from reaching European soil. Ultimately, though, even EU 
policies and partnerships that commit to long-term efforts to promote sustainable 
development and resilience to cope with deep-seated societal problems are driven by 
a focus on containment (Bundesregierung 2017). Containment has been criticized in 
the literature because it tends to be harmful for migrants and have negative 
economic consequences for the countries of origin (Micallef and Reitano 2017). We 
believe that such policies fundamentally misunderstand the socio-economic 
dynamics of the region, where migration – rather than containment – may stimulate 
economic growth and enhance political stability. 
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